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Philadelphia is one of the great cities of the world. To
the student of history who remembers that Nineveh and
Palmyra, Carthage and Thebes, and many another,
have been great, populous and wealthy, and then have
passed entirely away from the thoughts and lips of men,
Philadelphia has yet a glory that shal live always.
Mohammedanism has its Mecca, the cradle and the
acme of its hopes. Jew and Christian alike turn to
Jerusalem. But to the utmost verge of earth, and to
the last syllable of recorded time, in whatever language
liberty and freedom shall be honored among men, in
whatever accents government "of the people, by the
people and for the people" shall be asserted, there Philadelphia shall be remembered as the cradle of its birth.
18
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Her streets at some far distant day may be overgrown
with grass and her ruined and tottering buildings may
become the home of bats and birds of night; but around
her name will linger a luster that shall never depart.
Here, on 4 July,

1776,

was proclaimed

"Liberty

throughout all the land and to all the inhabitants thereof." And here, too, eleven years later, was another
notable event, when on 17 September, 1787, was issued

to the world the Constitution of these United States.
It is of the latter-" its defects and the necessity for its
revision"-that I shall speak to you to-night.
Just here it is well to call to mind the radical difference
between these two Conventions. That which met in
1776 was frankly democratic. Success in its great and
perilous undertaking was only possible with the support
of the people. The Great Declaration was an appeal
to the masses. It declared that all men were "created
equal and endowed with certain inalienable rightsamong them life, liberty and the pursuit of happinessto secure which, rights governments are instituted,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; and that when government becomes destructive
of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or
abolish it, and institute a new government in such form
as shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." Never was the right of revolution more. clearly
asserted or that government existed for the sole benefit
of the people, who were declared to be equal and endowed
with the right to change their government at will when
it did not subserve their welfare or obey their wishes.
Not a word about property. Everything was about
the people. The man was more than the dollar then.
And the Convention was in earnest. Every member
signed the Declaration, which was unanimously voted.
As Dr. Franklin pertinently observed, it behooved them
"to hang together or they would hang separately."
The Convention which met in 1787 was as reactionary
as the other had been revolutionary and democratic.
It had its beginning in commercial negotiations between
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the States. Wearied with a long war, enthusiasm for
liberty somewhat relaxed by the pressing need to earn
the comforts and necessities of life whose stores had
been diminished, and oppressed by the ban upon prosperity caused by the uncertainties and impotence of
the existing government of the Confederacy, the Convention of 1787 came together. Ignoring the maxim
that government should exist only by the consent of the
governed, it sat with closed doors, that no breath of the
popular will should affect their decisions. To free the
members from all responsibility, members were prohibited to make copies of any resolution or to correspond with constituents or others about matters pending before the convention. Any record of Yeas and
Nays was forbidden but one was kept without the knowledge of the Convention. The journal was kept secret,
a vote to destroy it fortunately failed, and Mr.
Madison's copy was published only after the lapse
of forty-nine years, when every member had passed
beyond human accountability. Only 12 States were
ever represented, and one of these withdrew before the
final result was reached. Of its 65 members only 55
ever attended, and so far from being unanimous, only
39 signed the Constitution, and some actively opposed
its ratification by their own States.
That the Constitution thus framed was reactionary
was a matter of course. There was, as we know, some
talk of a royal government with Frederick, Duke of
York, second son of George the Third, as King. Hamilton, whose subsequent great services as Secretary of the
Treasury have crowned him with a halo, and whose tragic
death has obliterated the memory of his faults, declared
himself in favor of the English form of government with
its hereditary Executive and its House of Lords, which
he denominated "a most noble institution." Failing
in that, he advocated an Executive elected by Congress
for life, Senators and Judges for life, and Governors of
States to be appointed by the President. Of these he
secured, as it has proved, the most important from his
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standpoint, the creation of Judges for life. The Convention was aware that a Constitution on Hamilton's
lines could not secure ratification by the several States.
But the Constitution adopted was made as undemocratic
as possible, and was very far from responding to the
condition, laid down in the Declaration of 1776, that
all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Hamilton, in a speech to the
Convention, stated that the members were agreed that
"we need to be rescued from the democracy." They
were rescued. Thomas Jefferson unfortunately was
absent as our Minister to France and took no part in
the Convention, though we owe largely to him the compromise by which the first ten amendments were agreed
to be adopted in exchange for ratification by several
States which otherwi-e would have been withheld.
In truth, the consent of the governed was not to be
asked. In the new government the will of the people
was not to control and was little to be consulted. Of
the three great departments of the government-Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary-the people were entrusted with the election only of the House of Representatives, to-wit, only one-sixth of the government,
even if that House had been made equal in authority
and power with the Senate, which was very far from
being the case. The Declaration of 1776 was concerned
with the rights of man. The Convention of 1787 entirely
ignored them. There was no Bill of Rights and the
guarantees of the great rights of freedom of speech and
of the press, freedom of religion, liberty of the people to
assemble, and right of petition, the right to bear arms,
exemption from soldiers being quartered upon the people,
exemption from general warrants, the right of trial by
jury and a grand jury, protection of the law of the land
and protection from seizure of private property for
other than public use, and then only upon just compensation; the prohibition of excessive bail or cruel and
unusual punishment, and the reservation to the people
and the States of all rights not granted by the Consti-
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tution-all these matters of the utmost importance to
the rights of the people were omitted, and were inserted
by the first ten amendments only because it was necessary to give assurances that such amendments would
be adopted in order to secure the ratification of the
Constitution by.the several States.
The Constitution was so far from being deemed satisfactory, even to the people and in the circumstances of
the time for which it was framed, that, as already stated,
only i i States voted for its adoption by the Convention,
and only 39 members out of 55 attending signed it,
some members subsequently opposing its ratification.
Its ratification by the conventions in the several States
was carried with the greatest difficulty, and in no State
was it submitted to a vote of the people themselves.
Massachusetts ratified only after a close vote and with a
demand for amendments, South Carolina and New
Hampshire also demanded amendments, as also did
Virginia and New York, both of which voted ratification
by the narrowest majorities and reserving to themselves
the right to withdraw, and two States rejected the Constitution and subsequently ratified only after Washington
had been elected and inaugurated-matters in which
they had no share.
George Washington was President of the Convention,
it is true, but as such was debarred from sharing in the
debates. His services, great as they were, had been
military, not civil, and he left no impress upon the
instrument of union so far as known. Yet it was admitted
that but for his popularity and influence the Constitution
would have failed of ratification by the several States,
especially in Virginia. Indeed, but for his great influence
the Convention would have adjourned without putting
its final hand to the Constitution, as it came very near
doing. Even his great influence would not have availed
but for the overwhelming necessity for some form of
government as a substitute for the rickety "Articles of
Confederation," which were utterly inefficient and whose
longer retention threatened civil war.
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An instrument so framed, adopted with such difficulty
and ratified after such efforts, and by such narrow
margins, could not have been a fair and full expression
of the consent of the governed. The men that made it
did not deem it perfect. Its friends agreed to sundry
amendments, ten in number, which were adopted by the
first Congress that met. The assumption by the new
Supreme Court of a power not contemplated, even by
the framers of the Constitution, to drag a State before
it as defendant in an action by a citizen of another State,
caused the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment.
The unfortunate method prescribed for the election of
President nearly caused a civil war in i8oi and forced
the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, and three
others were brought about as the result of the great
Civil War. The Convention of 1787 recognized itself
that the defects innate in the Constitution and which
would be developed by experience and the lapse of time,
would require amendments, and that instrument prescribed two different methods by which amendments
could be made.
Our Federal Constitution was adopted 1i9 years ago.
In that time every State has radically revised its Constitution, and most of them several times. Indeed, the
Constitution of New York requires that the question
of a Constitutional Convention shall be submitted to
its people at least once every twenty years. The object
is that the organic law shall keep abreast of the needs
and wants of the people and shall represent the will
and progress of to-day, and shall not, as is the case with
the Federal Constitution, be hampered by provisions
deemed best by the divided counsels of a small handful
of men, in providing for the wants of the government of
nearly a century and a quarter ago. Had those men
been gifted with divine foresight and created a Constitution fit for this day and its development, it would have
been unsuited for the needs of the times in which it was
fashioned.
When the Constitution was adopted in 1787 it was
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intended for 3,000,000 of people, scattered along the

Atlantic slope, from Massachusetts to the southern
boundary of Georgia. We are now trying to make it
do duty for very nearly ioo,ooo,ooo, from Maine to
Manila, from Panama and Porto Rico to the Pole. Then
our population was mostly rural, for three years later,
at the first Census in 1790, we had but five towns in the

whole Union which had as many as 6,500 inhabitants
each, and only two others had over 4,000. Now we have
the second largest city on the globe, with over 4,000,000

of inhabitants, and many that have passed the half
million mark, some of them of over a million population.
Three years later, in 1790, we had 75 post-offices with
$37,ooo annual post-office expenditures. Now we have
75,000 post-offices, 35,ooo rural delivery routes and a

post-office appropriation of nearly $200,000,000.
During the first ten years the total expenditures of
the Federal Government, including payments on the
Revolutionary debts, and including even the pensions,
averaged $io,ooo,ooo annually. Now the expenditures
are seventy-five times as much. 'hen the Constitution
was adopted Virginia was easily the first State in influence, population and wealth, having one-fourth the
population of the entire Union. North Carolina was
third, and New York, which then stood fifth, now has
double the population of the whole country at that
date, and several other States have now a population
greater than the original Union, whose very names were
then unheard and over whose soil the savage and the
buffalo roamed unmolested.
Steamboats, railroads,
gas, electricity (except as a toy in Franklin's hands),
coal mines, petroleum, and a thousand other things
which are a part of our lives to-day, were undiscovered.
Corporations, which now control the country and its
government, were then so few that not till four years
later, in 1791, was the first bank incorporated (in New
York), and the charter for the second bank was only
obtained by the subtlety of Aaron Burr, who concealed
the banking privileges in an act incorporating a water
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company-and corporations have had an affinity for
water ever since.
Had the Constitution been perfectly adapted to the
needs and wishes of the people of that day, we would
still have outgrown it. Time has revealed flaws in the
original instrument, and it was, as might be expected,
wholly without safeguards against that enormous growth
of corporations, and even of individuals, in wealth and
power, which has subverted the control of the government.
The glaring defect in the Constitution was that it was
not democratic. It gave, as already pointed out, to the
people-to the governed-the selection of only onesixth of the government, to-wit, one-half-by far the
weaker half-of the Legislative Department. The other
half, the Senate, was made elective at second hand by
the State Legislatures, and the Senators were given
not only longer terms, but greater power,. for all Presidential appointments, and treaties, were subjected to
confirmation by the Senate.
The President was intended to be elected at a still
further remove from the people, by being chosen by
electors, who, it was expected, would be selected by the
State Legislatures. The President thus was to be selected
at third hand, as it were. In fact, down till after the
memorable contest between Adams, Clay, Crawford and
Jackson, in 1824, in the majority of the States the Presidential electors were chosen by the State Legislatures,
and they were so chosen by South Carolina till after the
Civil War, and, in fact, by Colorado in 1876. The intention was that the electors should make independent
choice, but public opinion forced the transfer of the
choice of electors from the Legislatures to the ballot-box,
and then made of them mere figure-heads, with no power
but to voice the will of the people, who thus captured
the Executive Department. That Department, with
the House of Representatives, mark to-day the extent
of the share of the people in this government.
The Judiciary were placed a step still further removed
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from the popular choice. The Judges were to be selected
at fourth hand by a President (intended to be selected
at third hand) and subject to confirmation by a Senate
chosen at second hand. And to make the Judiciary
absolutely impervious to any consideration of the "consent of the governed," they are appointed for life.
It will be seen at a glance that a Constitution so devised
was intended not to express, but to suppress, or at least
disregard, the wishes and the consent of the governed.
It was admirably adapted for what has come to passthe absolute domination of the government by the
"business interests" which, controlling vast amounts
of capital and intent on more, can secure the election of
Senators by the small constituencies, the Legislatures
which elect them, and can dictate the appointment of
the Judges, and if they fail in that, the Senate, chosen
under their auspices, can defeat the nomination. Should
the President favor legislation and the House of Representatives pass the bill, the Senate, with its majority
chosen by corporation influences, can defeat it; and if
by any chance it shall yield to the popular will and pass
the bill, as was the case with the income tax, there
remains the Judiciary, who have assumed, without any
warrant, express or implied in the Constitution, the
power to declare any act unconstitutional at their own
will and without responsibility to any one.
The people's part in the government in the choice of
the House of Representatives, even when reinforced by
the Executive, whose election they have captured, is
an absolute nullity in the face of the Senate and the
Judiciary, in whose selection the people have no voice.
This, therefore, is the government of the United Statesa government by Senate and Judges-that is to say,
frankly, by whatever power can control the selection
of Senators and Judges. What is that power? We know
that it is not the American people.
Let us not be deceived by forms, but look at the substance. Government rests not upon forms, but upon a
true reply to the question, "Where does the governing
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power reside?" The Roman legions bore to the last
day of the empire upon their standards the words, "The
Senate and the Roman People," long centuries after
the real power had passed from the curia and the comitia
to the barracks of the Pretorian Guards, and when there
was no will in Rome save that of their master. There
were still Tribunes of the People, and Consuls, and a
Senate, and the title of a Republic; but the real share
of the people in the Roman government was the donation
to them of "bread and circuses" by their tyrants.
Years after the victor of Marengo had been crowned
Emperor and the sword of Austerlitz had become the
one power in France, the French coins and official documents still bore the inscription of "French Republic""R~publique Francaise."
In England to-day there is a monarchy in form, but
we know that in truth the real government of England
is vested in a single House of Parliament, elected by the
people, under a restricted suffrage; that the real Executive is not the King, but the Prime Minister and his
cabinet, practically elected by the House of Commons
and holding office at the will of the majority in that
House; that the King has not even the veto power, except
nominally, since it has not been exercised in a single
instance for more than 200 years, and that the sole
function of the House of Lords-a club of rich men
representing great vested interests-is in the exercise
of a suspensive veto (of which the King has been deprived), which is exercised only till the Commons make
up their mind the bill shall pass-when the House of
Lords always gives way, as the condition upon which
their continued existence rests. So in this country,
we retain the forms of a Republic. We still choose our
President and the House of Representatives by the
people; but the real power does not reside in them or
in the people. It rests with those great "interests"
which select the majority of the Senate and the Judges.
This being the situation, the sole remedy possible is
by amendment of the Constitution to make it demo-
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cratic, and place the selection of these preponderating
bodies in the hands of the people.
First, the election of Senators should be given to the
people. Even then consolidated wealth will secure
some of the Senators; but it would not be able, as now,
at all times to count with absolute certainty upon a
majority of the Senate as its creatures. Five times has
a bill, proposing such amendment to the Constitution,
passed the House of Representatives by a practically
unanimous vote, and each time it has been lost in the
Senate; but never by a direct vote. It has always been
disposed of by the chloroform process of referring the
bill to a committee, which never reports it back, and
never will. It is too much to expect that the great corporations which control a majority of the Senate will ever
voluntarily transfer to the people their profitable and
secure hold upon supreme power by permitting the
passage of an amendment to elect Senators by the people.
The only hope is in the alternative plan of amendment,
authorized by the Constitution, to wit: the call of a
Constitutional Convention upon the application of twothirds of the States, to wit: thirty States. More than
that number have already instructed in favor of an amendment to elect Senators by the people.
It may be recalled here that in the Convention of 1787
Pennsylvania did vote for the election of Senators by
the people. A strong argument used against this was
that the farming interest, being the largest, would control the House and that the Senate could only be given
to the commercial interests by making its members
elective by the Legislatures-which was propheticthough the deciding influence was the fear of the small
States that if the Senate was elected by the people its
membership would be based on population.
It is high time that we had a Constitutional Convention, after the lapse of near a century and a score
of years. The same reasons which have time and again
caused the individual States to amend their Constitutions imperatively require a Convention to adjust
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the Constitution of the Union to the changed conditions
of the times and to transfer to the people themselves
that control of the government which is now exercised
for the profit and benefit of the "interests."
Those
interests, with all the power of their money and the
large part of the press which they own or control, will
resist the call of such a convention. They will be aided,
doubtless, by some of the smaller States who may fear
a loss of their equal representation in the Senate. But
in truth and justice it may be that there might be some
modification now in that respect without injury to the
smaller States. There is no longer any reason why
Delaware, or Nevada, or Rhode Island should have
as many Senators as New York, or Pennsylvania, or
Illinois. It would be enough to grant to every State
having a million of inhabitants or less, one Senator, and
to allot to each State having over one million of inhabitants an additional Senator for every million above one
million and for a fractional part if over three-quarters
of a million. This, -while not putting the Senate frankly
on the basis of population, would remove the dissatisfaction with the present unjust ratio and would quiet
the opposition to the admission of new States whose
area and development entitle them to self-government,
but whose population does not entitle them to two
Senators.
The election of President is now made by the people,
who have captured it, though the Constitution did not
intend the people should have any choice in naming
the ERecutive. The dangerous and unsafe plan adopted
in 1787 was changed in consequence of the narrowlyaverted disaster in i8oi. But the method in force .still
leaves much to be desired. It readily lends itself to the
choice of a minority candidate. It is an anomaly that
i,moo votes in New York (as in 1884) should swing 70
electoral votes (35 from one candidate to the other)
and thus decide the result. The consequence is that
while, nominally, any citizen of the Republic is eligible
to the Presidency, only citizens of two or three of the
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larger States, with doubtful electoral votes, are in fact
eligible. All others are barred. For proof of this, look
at the history of our Presidential elections. For the first
forty years of the Union the Presidents came from two
States-Virginia and Massachusetts. Then there followed a period when the growing West requiring recognition, Tennessee, Ohio, and New York commanded
the situation for the next sixteen years. The Mexican
War gave us a soldier who practically represented no
State, and was succeeded by a New Yorker. Then for
the only time in our history "off States" had a showing,
and Pennsylvania and New Hampshire had their innings.
Since then the successful candidates have been again
strictly limited to "pivotal States "-New York in the
East and Illinois, Indiana and Ohio in the West.
This condition is unsatisfactory. The magnetic Blaine
from Maine was defeated, as was Bryan from Nebraska.
Had the former hailed from New York and the latter
from Illinois, the electoral votes and influence of those
States would have secured their election.
It would be dangerous, and almost a certain provocation of civil war, to change the election of President
to a per capita vote by the whole of the Union. Then a
charge of a fraudulent vote at any precinct or voting
place, however remote, might affect the result; and as
frauds would most likely occur in those States where the
majorities are largest-as in Pennsylvania or Texas,
Ohio or Georgia-a contest would always be certain.
Whereas, now, frauds in States giving large majorities,
unless of great enough magnitude to change the electoral
vote of the whole State, can have no effect. The remedy
is, preserving the electoral vote system as now, and
giving the smaller States, as now, the advantage of
electoral votes to represent their Senators, to divide the
electoral vote of each State according to the popular
vote for each candidate, giving each his pro rata of the
electoral vote on that basis, the odd elector being apportioned to the candidate having the largest fraction.
Thus in New York, Mr. Blaine would have gotten 17
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electoral votes and Mr. Cleveland i8. Other States would
have also divided, more or less evenly; but the result
would be that the choice of President would no longer
be restricted to two or three States, as in our past history,
and is likely to be always the case as long as the whole
electoral vote of two or three large pivotal States must
swing to one side or other and determine the result.
This change would avoid the present evil of large sums
being spent to carry the solid electoral vote of "pivotal"
States, for there would cease to be "pivotal" States.
At the same time this would avoid the open gulf into
which a per capita ballot by the whole Union would lead
us. While the electoral vote of a State should be divided,
pro rata, according to the popular vote for each candidate, it is essential that each State should vote as one
district, since its boundaries are unchangeable. To
permit the Legislature of each State to divide it into
electoral districts would simply open up competition
in the art of gerrymandering.
By the Convention of 1787 the term of the President
was originally fixed at seven years and he was made
ineligible for re-election. This was reduced to four years
by a compromise that he could be re-elected without
limitation. This was done in the interest of those who
favored a strong government and a long tenure. Washington imposed a limitation by his example which will
not always be binding. An amendment making the
term six years and the President ineligible to re-election
has long been desired by a large portion of the public.
Indeed, when the Constitutional Convention of the
Union shall assemble, as it must do some day, to remodel
our Constitution to fit it to face the dangers and conform to the views of the people of this age, with the aid
of our experience, in the past, it is more than probable
that the powers of the Executive will be more restricted.
His powers are now greater than those of any sovereign
in Europe. The real restrictions upon Executive power
at present are not in Constitutional provisions, but in
the Senate and Judiciary, which often negative the
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popular will, which he represents more accurately than
they.
And now we come to the most important of the changes
necessary to place the government of the Union in the
hands of the people. By far the most serious defect and
danger in the Constitution is the appointment of Judges
for life, subject to confirmation by the Senate. It is a
far more serious matter than it was when the Convention
of 1787 framed the Constitution. A proposition was
made in the Convention-as we now know from Mr.
Madison's Journal-that the Judges should pass upon
the constitutionality of acts of Congress. This was
defeated 5 June, receiving the vote of only two States.
It was renewed no less than three times, i. e., on 6 June,
21 July, and finally again for the fourth time on 15
August; and though it had the powerful support of Mr.
Madison and Mr. James Wilson, at no time did it receive
the votes of more than three States. On this last occasion
(15 August) Mr. Mercer thus summed up the thought
of the Convention: "He disapproved of the doctrine,
that the Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, should
have authority to declare a law void. He thought laws
ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be
incontrovertible."
Prior to the Convention, the Courts of four StatesNew Jersey, Rhode Island, Virginia and North Carolinahad expressed an opinion that they could hold acts of
the Legislature unconstitutional. This was a new doctrine never held before (nor in any other country since)
and met with strong disapproval. In Rhode Island the
movement to remove the offending judges was stopped
only on a suggestion that they could be "dropped" by
the Legislature at the annual election which was done.
The decisions of these four State courts were recent
and well known to the Convention. Mr. Madison and
Mr. Wilson favored the new doctrine of the paramount
judiciary, doubtless deeming it a safe check upon legislation to be operated only by lawyers. They attempted
to get it into the Federal Constitution in its least objec-
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tionable shape-the judicial veto before final passage
of an act, which would thus save time and besides would
enable the legislature to avoid the objections raised.
But even in this diluted form, and though four times
presented by these two very able and influential members
this suggestion of a judicial veto at no time received
the votes of more than one-fourth of the States.
The subsequent action of the Supreme Court in assuming the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional
was without a line in the Constitution to authorize it,
either expressly or by implication. The Constitution
recited carefully and fully the matters over which the
courts should have jurisdiction, and there is nothing,
and after the above vote four times refusing jurisdiction
there could be nothing, indicating any power to declare
an act of Congress unconstitutional and void.
Had the Convention given such power to the courts,
it certainly would not have left its exercise final and
unreviewable. It gave the Congress power. to override
the veto of the President, though that veto was expressly
given, thus showing that in the last analysis the will
of the people, speaking through the legislative power,
should govern. Had the Convention supposed the courts
would assume such power, it would certainly have given
Congress some review over judicial action and certainly
would not have placed the Judges irretrievably beyond.
"the consent of the governed" and regardless of the
popular will by making them appointive, and further
clothing them with the undemocratic prerogative of
tenure for life.
Such power does not exist in any other country and
never has. It is therefore not essential to our security.
It is not conferred by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, the Convention, as we have seen, after the fullest
debate, four times, on four several days, refused by a
decisive vote to confer such power. The Judges not
only have never exercised such power in England, where
there is no written Constitution, but they do not exercise
it in France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, or in any
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other country which, like them, has a written Constitution.
A more complete denial of popular control of this
government could not have been conceived than the
placing such unreviewable power in the hands of men,
not elected by the people, and holding office for life.
The legal-tender act, the financial policy of the government, was invalidated by one court and then validated
by another, after a change in its personnel. Then the
income tax, which had been held constitutional by the
Court for an hundred years, was again so held, and then
by a sudden change of vote by one Judge it was held
unconstitutional, nullified and set at naught, though it
had passed by a nearly unanimous vote both Houses of
Congress, containing many lawyers who were the equals
if not the superiors of the vacillating Judge, and had been
approved by the President and voiced the will of the
people. This was all negatived (without any warrant in
the Constitution for the Court to set aside an act of
Congress) by the vote of one Judge; and thus one hundred million dollars, and more, of annual taxation, was
transferred from those most able to bear it and placed
upon the backs of those who already carried more than
their fair share of burdens of government. Under an
untrue assumption of authority given by thirty-nine
dead men one man nullified the action of Congress and
the President and the will of seventy-five millions of
living people, and in the thirteen years since has taxed
the property and labor of the country, by his sole vote,
$i,300,ooo,ooo, which Congress, in compliance with the
public will and relying on previous decisions of the Court,
,had decreed should be paid out of the excessive incomes
of the rich.
In England one-third of the revenue is derived from
the superfluities of the very wealthy, by the levy of a
graduated income tax, and a graduated inheritance tax,
increasing the per cent. with the size of the income.
The same system is in force in all other civilized countries.
In not one of them would the hereditary monarch venture
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to veto or declare null such a tax. In this country alone,
the people, speaking through their Congress, and with
the approval of their Executive, cannot put in force a
single measure of any nature whatever with assurance
that it shall meet with the approval of the courts; and
its failure to receive such approval is fatal, for, unlike
the veto of the Executive, the unanimous vote of Congress
(and the income tax came near receiving such vote)
cannot avail against it. Of what avail shall it be if Congress shall conform to the popular demand and enact a
"Rate Regulation" bill and the President shall approve
it, if five lawyers, holding office for life and not elected
by the people, shall see fit to destroy it, as they did the
income tax law? Is such a government a reasonable one,
and can it be longer tolerated after 120 years of experience have demonstrated the capacity of the people for
self-government? If five lawyers can negative the will
of ioo,ooo,ooo of men, then the art of government is
reduced to the selection of those five lawyers.
A power without limit, except in the shifting views of
the court, lies in the construction placed upon the Fourteenth Amendment, which passed, as every one knows,
solely to prevent discrimination against the colored race,
has been construed by the Court to confer upon it jurisdiction to hold any provision of any statute whatever
"not due process of law." This draws the whole body
of the reserved rights of the States into the maelstrom
of the Federal Courts, subject only to such forbearance
as the Federal Supreme Court of the day, or in any
particular case, may see fit to exercise. The limits
between State and Federal jurisdiction depend upon
the views of five men at any given time; and we have a
government of men and not a government of laws, prescribed beforehand.
At first the Court generously exempted from its veto,
the Police Power of the several States. But since then
it has proceeded to set aside an act of the Legislature
of New York restricting excessive hours of labor, which
act had been sustained by the highest court in that great
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State. Thus labor can obtain no benefit from the growing
humanity of the age, expressed by the popular will in
any State if such Statute does not meet the views of
five elderly lawyers, selected by influences naturally
antagonistic to the laboring classes and whose training
and daily associations certainly cannot incline them in
favour of restrictions upon the power of the employer.
The preservation of the autonomy of the several
States and of local self-government is essential to the
maintenance of our liberties, which would expire in the
grasp of a consolidated despotism. Nothing can save
us from this centripetal force but the speedy repeal of
the Fourteenth Amendment or a recasting of its language
in terms that no future court can misinterpret it.
The vast political power now asserted and exercised
by the court to set aside public policies, after their full
determination by Congress, cannot safely be left in the
hands of any body of men without supervision or control
by any other authority whatever. If the President errs,
his mandate expires in four years, and his party as well
as himself is accountable to the people at the ballot-box
for his stewardship. If members of Congress err, they
too must account to their constituents. But the Federal
Judiciary hold for life, and though popular sentiment
should change the entire personnel of the other two great
departments of government, a whole generation must
pass away before the people could get control of the
Judiciary, which possesses an irresponsible and unrestricted veto upon the action of the other departmentsirresponsible because impeachment has become impossible, and if it were possible it could not be invoked
as to erroneous decisions, unless corruption were shown.
The control of the policy of government is thus not in
the hands of the people, but in the power of a small body
of men not chosen by the people, and holding for life.
In many cases which might be mentioned, had the Court
been elective, men not biased in favor of colossal wealth
would have filled more seats upon the bench, and if
there had been such decision as in the income tax case,
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long ere this, under the tenure of a term of years, new
incumbents would have been chosen, who, returning to
the former line of decisions, would have upheld the right
of Congress to control the financial policy of the government in accordance with the will of the people of this
day and age, and not according to the shifting views
which the Court has imputed to language used by the
majority of the fifty-five men who met in Philadelphia
in 1787. Such methods of controlling the policy of a
government are no whit more tolerable than the conduct
of the augurs of old who gave the permission for peace or
war, for battle or other public movements, by declaring
from the flight of birds, the inspection of the entrails
of fowls, or other equally wise devices, that the omens
were lucky or unlucky-the rules of such divination
being in their own breasts and hence their decisions
beyond remedy.
It may be that this power in the courts, however
illegally grasped originally, has been too long acquiesced
in to be now questioned. If so, the only remedy which
can be applied is to make the Judges elective, and for
a term of years, for no people can permit its will to be
denied, and its destinies shaped, by men it did not choose,
and over whose conduct it has no control, by reason of
its having no power to change them and select other
agents at the close of a fixed term.
Every Federal Judgeship below the Supreme Court
can be abolished by an act of Congress, since the power
which creates a Federal district or circuit can abolish
it at will. If Congress can abolish one, it can abolish all.
Several districts have from time to time been abolished,
notably two in i8or; and we know that the sixteen
Circuit Judges created by the Judiciary Act of i8oi were
abolished eighteen months later.
It is true that under the stress of a great public sentiment every United States District and Circuit Judge
can be legislated out of office by a simple act of Congress,
and a new system recreated with new Judges. It is also
true, as has been pointed out by distinguished lawyers,
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that while the Supreme Court cannot be thus abolished,
it exercises its appellate functions "with such exceptions
and under such regulations as Congress shall make"
(Const., Art. III, sec. 2), and as Congress enacted the
Judiciary Act of 1789, it has often amended it, and can
repeal it. Judge Marshall recognized this in Marbury v.
Madison, in which case in an obiter opinion he had asserted
the power to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional,
for he wound up by refusing the logical result, the issuing
of the inandamus sought, because .Congress had not
conferred jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to issue
it.
In 1831 the attempt was made to repeal section 25
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, by virtue of which writs
of error lay to the State Supreme Courts in certain cases.
Though the section was not repealed, the repeal was
supported and voted for by both Henry Clay, James K.
Polk, and other leaders of both of the great parties of
that day. But what is needed is not the exercise of
these powers which Congress undoubtedly possesses and
in an emergency will exercise, but a constitutional revision by which the Federal Judges, like other public
servants, shall be chosen by the people for a term of
years.
It may be said that the Federal Judges are now in
office for life and it would be unjust to dispossess them.
So it was with the State Judges in each State when it
changed from life Judges to Judges elected by the people;
but that did not stay the hand of a much-needed reform.
It must be remembered that when our Federal Constitution was adopted in 1787, in only one State was the
Governor elected by the people, and the Judges in none,
and that in most, if not all, the States, the Legislature,
especially the Senate branch, was chosen by a restricted
suffrage. The schoolmaster was not abroad in the land,
the masses were illiterate and government by the people
was a new experiment and property-holders were afraid
of it. The danger to property rights did not come then,
as now, from the other direction-from the corporations
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and others holding vast accumulations of capital and by
their power crushing or threatening to crush out all
those owning modest estates.
In the State governments the conditions existing in
1787 have long since been changed. In all the States
the Governor and the members of both branches of the
Legislature have long since been made elective by manhood suffrage. In all the forty-five States save four
(Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island), the Judges now hold for a term of years, and in
three of these they are removable (as in England) upon
a majority vote of the Legislature, thus preserving a
supervision of their conduct which is utterly lacking as
to the Federal Judiciary. In Rhode Island the Judges
were thus dropped summarily, once, when they had
held an act of the Legislature invalid. In thirty-three
States the Judges are elected by the people, in five States
by the Legislature and in seven States they are appointed
by the Governor with the consent of the Senate. Even
in England the Judges hold office subject to removal
upon the vote of a bare majority in Parliament-though
there the Judges have never asserted any power to set
aside an act of Parliament. There the will of the people,
when expressed through their representatives in Parliament, is final. The King cannot veto it, and no Judge
has ever dreamed he had power to set it aside.
There are those who believe and have asserted that
corporate wealth can exert such influence that even if
Judges are not actually selected by the great corporations, no Judge can take his seat upon the Federal bench
if his nomination and confirmation are opposed by the
allied plutocracy. It has never been charged that such
Judges are corruptly influenced. But the passage of a
Judge from the bar to the bench does not necessarily"
destroy his prejudices or his predilections. If they go
upon the bench knowing that this potent influence if
not used for them, at least withheld its opposition to their
appointment, or their confirmation, and usually with a
natural and perhaps unconscious bias from having spent
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their lives at the bar in advocacy of corporate claims,
this will unconsciously, but effectively, be reflected in
the decisions they make. Having attempted as lawyers
to persuade courts to view debated questions from the
standpoint of aggregated wealth, they often end by
believing sincerely in the correctness of such views, and
not unnaturally put them in force when in turn they
themselves ascend the bench. This trend in Federal
decisions has been pronounced. Then, too, incumbents
of seats upon the Federal Circuit and District bench
cannot be oblivious to the influence which procures
promotion; and how fatal to confirmation by the plutocratic majority in the Senate will be the expression of
any judicial views not in accordance with the "safe,
sane and sound" predominance of wealth.
As far back as 1820, Mr. Jefferson had discovered the
"sapping and mining," as he termed it, of the life-tenure,
appointive Federal Judiciary, owing no gratitude to the
people for their appointment and fearing no inconvenience from their conduct, however arbitrary, in the
discharge of such office. In short, they possess the
autocratic power of absolute irresponsibility. "Step by
step, one goes very far," says the French proverb. This
is true of the Federal Judiciary. Compare their jurisdiction in i8oi, when Marshall ascended the bench, and
their jurisdiction in 19o6. The Constitution has been
remade and rewritten by the judicial glosses put upon it.
Had it been understood in 1787 to mean what it is construed to mean to-day, it is safe to say that not a single
State would have ratified it.
An elective Judiciary is less partisan, for in many
States half the Judges are habitually taken from each
party, and very often in other States the same men are
nominated by both parties, as notably the recent selection
by a Republican convention of a Democratic successor to
Judge Parker. The organs of plutocracy have asserted
that in one State the elective Judges are selected by the
party boss. But they forget that if that is true, he must
in such a condition of affairs name the Governor too
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and through the Governor he would select the appointive
Judges. If the people are to be trusted to select the
Executive and the Legislature, they are fit to select
the Judges. The people are wiser than the appointing
power which, viewing Judgeships as patronage, has
with scarcely an exception filled the Federal bench with
appointees of its own party. Public opinion, which is
the corner-stone of free government, has no place in
the selection or supervision of the judicial augurs who
assume power to set aside the will of the people when
declared by Congress and the Executive. Whatever
their method of divination, equally with the augurs
of old they are a law to themselves and control events.
As was said by a great lawyer lately deceased, Judge
Seymour D. Thompson, in i891 (25 Am. Law Review,
288): "If the proposition to make the Federal Judiciary
elective instead of appointive is once seriously discussed
before the people, nothing can stay the growth of that
sentiment, and it is almost certain that every session
of the Federal Supreme Court will furnish material to
stimulate that growth."
Great aggregations of wealth know their own interests,
and it is very certain that there is no reform and no
constitutional amendment that they will oppose more
bitterly than this. What, then, is the interest of all
others in regard to it ?
Another undemocratic feature of the Constitution is
that which requires all Federal officials to be appointed
by the President or heads of departments. This is a
great evil. Overwhelming necessity has compelled the
enactment of the civil service law, which has protected
many thousands of minor officials. But there has been
no relief as to the 75,000 postmasters. When the Constitution was adopted there were only 75 postmasters,
and it was contemplated that the President or Postmaster-General would really appoint. But this constitutional provision is a dead letter. The selection of this
army of 75,000 postmasters, in a large majority of cases,
is made by neither, but in the unconstitutional mode of
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selection by Senator, Member of the House, or a political
boss. There is no reason why Congress should not be
empowered by amendment to authorize the Department
to lay off the territory patronizing each post-office as a
district in which an election shall he held once in four
years, at the time a member of Congress is chosen, and
by the same machinery, the officer giving bond and
being subject to the same supervision as now. Thus
the people of each locality will get the postmaster they
prefer, irrespective of the general result in the Union,
relieving the Department at Washington of much call
upon its time, which can be used for the public interest
in some better way; and, besides, it will remove from
the election of President and Members of Congress considerations of public patronage. Elections will then
more largely turn upon the great issues as to matters
of public policy.
Another obstruction to the effective operation of the
popular will is the fact that, though Congressmen are
elected in November, they do not take their seats (unless
there is a called session) for thirteen months, and in the
meantime the old Congress, whose policy may have
been repudiated at the polls, sits and legislates in any
event till 4 March following. This surely needs amendment, which fortunately can be done by statute. In
England, France and other countries the old Parliament
ceases before the election, and the new Assembly meets
at once and puts the popular will into law.
In thus discussing the defects of the Federal Constitution I have but exercised the right of the humblest citizen.
Few will deny that defects exist. I have indicated what,
in my opinion, are the remedies. As to this, many will
differ. If better can be found, let us adopt them. But
could the matter be more appropriately discussed than
on the spot where the original Constitution was debated?
For my part, I believe in popular government. The
remedy for the halting, half-way popular government
which we have is more democracy. When some one
observed to Mr. Gladstone that the "people are not
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always right," he replied, "No; but they are rarely
wrong." When they are wrong, their intelligence and
their interests combine to make them correct the wrong.
But when rulers, whether Kings, or life Judges, or great
corporations, commit an error against the interest of
the masses, there is no such certainty of correction
The growth of this country in population and in
material wealth has made it the marvel of the ages.
"But what avail the plow or sail,
Or land or life, if freedom fail?"

The government and the destinies of a great people
should always be kept in their own hands.

